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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
A novei question concerning a city imposed charge on real
property after a lease had been executed was involved in Black
v. General Wiper Co., Inc. 22 Here, a landlord was awarded pos-

session of the rented premises in a summary proceeding, but was
denied recovery of sewer rents levied against the property during the tenancy and paid by the landlord. These sewer rents were
first imposed in 1950, about a year and a half after the lease was
executed, by a local law of New York City which declared, ".
the owner of . . . real property connected with the sewer system
. . . shall pay a sewer rent or charge for the use of the sewer
system."' Although the lease was silent upon the matter, the
landlord maintained that the tenant should bear this burden. The
court gave the problem extended treatment in convincingly affirming the Appellate Division's denial. 2'
Basically, of course, the burden rests where the parties intended, and since the lease said nothing concerning sewer rents,
the court looked to the nature of the overall scheme of the obligation. No charge shall be imposed upon a tenant except those
specified in the lease, and any ambiguity in that contract must be
resolved against a landlord. 5 When the lease was executed in
1948, it was common knowledge that every city in the state since
1929 was empowered by express legislative mandate to impose
sewer rents.2 6 Therefore, the court pointed out, it cannot be said
that these charges were of such an improbable character as to be
beyond the contemplation of the parties. The very wording of
the statute shows it did not intend to alter existing obligations of
the landlord and tenant, viz., "the owner . . . shall pay . . . Y,27
No new burden was imposed on the landlord since property taxes
are the main source of revenue for the city and the maintenance
of the sewers was then included in the city's budget, and in a like
manner, sewer improvements were borne by property owners in
the form of special assessments based on the value of the property. Thus, the burden of the sewer rents fell upon the landlord.
B. Personal Property
Sales
It is clearly settled that simple delivery of possession of personal property to another as a depository, pledgee, or agent is
insufficient to preclude the owner from asserting title when the
22. 305 N. Y. 386, 113 N. E. 2d 528 (1953).

23. NEW YORK C=r LocAL LAw 67 (1950);
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24. 280 App. Div. 807, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 493 (2d Dep't 1952).
25. 455 Seventh Ave. v. Frederick Hussey Realty Corp., 295 N. Y. 166, 172; 6
N. E. 2d 761, 763 (1946).
26. GE-. Crr LA w § 20 (26).
27. See note 23 ujra.
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person so entrusted disposes of the property in an unauthorized
manner. 28 Moreover, the fact that the person to whom the owner
delivers the chattel is a dealer in similar merchandise will not
work an estoppe 29 Nor will the additional circumstance that
the owner allows the possessor to exhibit the article in order to
get offers of purchase create an estoppel 3 0 However, it is equally
clear that "but slight additional circumstances may turn the
scale" against the true owner, 1 and estop him from asserting
title against a purchaser in good faith. In Zendman v. Harry
Winston, Inc., 32 a purchaser of a diamond ring at an auction sued
for a judgment declaring his right to ownership. Defendant, who
counterclaimed in replevin, had entrusted the ring to the proprietor of the auction gallery under a memorandum reciting that the
ring was for his examination only and that title was not to pass
until the owner accepted the dealer's offer to pay the indicated
price. With the knowledge of defendant owner, the ring was displayed in the dealer's show windows. Such delivery of merchandise "on memorandum" had been followed by the parties in the
regular course of business for some years, and periodically an
officer of defendant would check the items sent to the dealer and
would settle accounts. Less than two months after plaintiff's
purchase, this customary procedure was interrupted as the defendant demanded its return from the plaintiff, a 'day before an
involuntary petition of bankruptcy was filed against the dealer.
Since the sale to the plaintiff had taken place in New Jersey,
the law of that state controlled. However, as the court pointed
out, the wording of the New York statute is identical with that
of the pertinent New Jersey law: ". . . where goods are sold
by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell
them under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the
buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had,
unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from
denying the seller's authority to sell."'- (Emphasis supplidd.)
In deciding for the plaintiff on the basis of the statute as interpreted by the courts, the Court of -Appeals found the "additional circumstances" 3 4 necessary to estop the defendant from as.where the true owner
serting his title against the plaintiff. ".
28. Ballard v. Burgett, 40 N. Y. 314 (1869) ; McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y.
325 (1871).
29. Utica Trust & Deposit Co. v. Decker, 244 N. Y. 340, 155 N. F. 665 (1927);
2 WniLsoSN, SALES § 314 (Rev. ed. 1948).
30. Utica Trust & Deposit Co. v. Decker, supra.
31. 2 WILLsToN, op. cit. supra note 29 § 315.
32. 305 N. Y. 180, 111 N. E. 2d 875 (1953).
33. PERs. PRoP. LAw § 104.
34. See note 31 sujIra.
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holds out another, or allows him to appear, as the owner of, or as
having full power of disposition over the property, and innocent
third parties are thus led into dealing with such apparent owner,
they will be protected.'' 35 For more than a month defendant
acquiesced in the public display of the ring. Defendant's officer
also made no effort to inform possible purchasers of the nature
of the agreement. And although such regular dealings were "on
memorandum," the owner did not insist on compliance with the
provisions he himself laid down. The owner was therefore responsible for the appearance of a general, unrestricted authority
in the dealer to sell such items received on such memorandum and
cannot be heard later to assert his title against the innocent purchaser.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in the recent case of Nelson v. Wolf,36 considered the statute for the first time. There too
the defendant had consigned a diamond ring to the dealer under
a memorandum similar to the one employed in this case. The
dealer had used the ring as collateral for a $4,000 loan from the
plaintiff and later the debt was canceled as consideration for the
plaintiff's purchase of the ring, although no bill of sale was ever
given. Subsequently, the plaintiff redelivered the ring to the
dealer upon another memorandum and the dealer returned the
ring to the defendant upon his demand. Observing that the plaintiff was not a bona fide purchaser in the ordinary and regular
course of business, because he never received a bill of sale or other
written evidence of the purchase, and previous unsatisfactory
dealings with the dealer put him on notice that the title might be
questionable, the New Jersey court held that the defendant was
not precluded from denying the dealer's authority to sell. The
Court of Appeals in the instant case easily distinguished the New
Jersey decision on the facts in reversing the Appellate Division 7
and holding for the plaintiff.
XII.

ToRTs

Last Clear Chance
While the doctrine of last clear chance has been severely criticized, it is generally justified as a modification of the strict rule
of contributory negligence.' Defendant's negligence is said to be
35. McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank, suPraat 329.
36. 4 N. J. 76, 71 A. 2d 630 (1950).
37. 279 App. Div. 28, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 618 (1st Dep't 1951).
1. See PRossEP, TORTS 416 (1941); Lee v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 269 N. Y. 53,
55, 198 N. E. 629, 630 (1935), requiring that an issue of contributory negligence be
present before last clear chance can be invoked. For a complete survey of the last clear
chance doctrine, see 92 A. L R. 48, supplemented by 119 A. L R. 1041.
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